UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
SOUTHERN FOREST WATCH, INC., )
et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, ) Civil Action No.
) 3:13-cv-116-JMH-HBG
v. )
) MEMORANDUM OPINION
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ) AND ORDER
SALLY JEWELL, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
***
This matter is before the Court upon the Joint Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction [D.E. 14] filed by Defendants
Sally Jewell, Secretary of the Interior, Jonathan B. Jarvis,
Director of the National Park Service, Dale A. Ditmanson,
Superintendent of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, and
Patricia Wissinger, Assistant Superintendent of the Great Smoky
Mountains National Park, as well as Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Discovery. [D.E. 25]. Each motion has been fully briefed. [D.E.
18; 27; 30; 31]. This matter being fully briefed, and the Court
being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is now ripe for review.
I. Procedural Background
The National Park Service (NPS) approved a $4.00 per
person, per night fee for backcountry camping and shelters,
pursuant to the Federal Lands Recreation Act (FLREA), 16 U.S.C.
§ 6801, et seq. Additionally, the NPS instituted an online
reservation system for obtaining permits and paying the $4.00
permit fee to camp in the backcountry of the Great Smoky
Mountains.
Plaintiffs allege that, of the backcountry campsites within
the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, eighty percent “are
unrestricted on use other than registering the party and
vehicles upon arrival at certain trailheads and designating
destinations and itineraries for backcamping trips.” [D.E. 24 at
11]. The other twenty percent of campsites, according to
Plaintiffs, are reservation campsites. Plaintiffs claim that
under the old reservation system there were no fees, and
reservations could be made in advance by calling the park or by
registering in person the day of the trip. [D.E. 24 at 12-13].
Plaintiffs allege that this system “worked perfectly and
seamlessly.” [D.E. 24 at 14].
Plaintiffs filed this action challenging the imposition of
the new permit system, specifically the implementation of an
online reservation system and backcountry camping fee in the
Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants
manufactured false justifications and assertions . . .
in order to dissolve the current working permit system
for access to the backcounty [sic] sections of the
Smoky Mountains and to replace it with another
reservation system in order to assert more control and
limit access to the backcountry sections of the Smoky
Mountains.
[D.E. 24 at 3-4]. Plaintiffs claim that the new reservation
system and fee “is onerous and burdensome to those who wish to
backpack” and that Defendants “implemented new and absurd rules
and regulations.” [D.E. 24 at 4-5].
Under the new system, Plaintiffs allege, a camper must have
internet access and a credit card, reservations are allowed
thirty days in advance, and the process requires clicking
through multiple webpages, which must be done within 15 minutes.
[D.E. 24 at 20]. Plaintiffs also note that if you do not have
internet access, “reservations can be made by telephone or by
personally appearing at Sugarland Visitor Center.” [D.E. 24 at
20].
Based upon the imposition of the new online reservation
system and $4.00 charge for camping in the backcountry of the
Great Smoky Mountains National Park, Plaintiffs bring several
claims seeking a declaratory judgment from this Court. In Count
I, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Defendants
violated 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 by intentionally making public
misrepresentations and false assertions. [D.E. 24 at 22-23]. In
Count II, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the grant
of free, exclusive, and privileged use of portions of the park,
to the exclusion of the public, violates 16 U.S.C. § 3. [D.E. 24
at 23]. In Count III, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment
that Defendants are not allowed to charge a backpacker fee under
the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 6801,
et seq. [D.E. 24 at 23-24]. In Count IV, Plaintiffs seek a
declaratory judgment that they are free to backpack anywhere
within the Great Smoky Mountains National Park and are not
limited to areas designated for collection of the backpacker
tax. [D.E. 24 at 24-25]. In Count V, Plaintiffs seek a
declaratory judgment that Defendants are not entitled to charge
a backpacker fee under 16 U.S.C. § 6802(g) and that the
implementation of the online reservation system is in violation
of 16 U.S.C. § 1. [D.E. 24 at 25-27]. In Count VI, Plaintiffs
seek a declaratory judgment that the online reservation system
and backpacker tax exceeds the authority provided to Defendants.
[D.E. 24 at 27]. In Count VII, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory
judgment, under the Administrative Procedures Act, that the
decision to implement the online reservation system and
backpacker tax was arbitrary and capricious. [D.E. 24 at 28-29].
In Count VIII, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that
Defendants failed to comply with 16 U.S.C. § 6803 and 5 U.S.C. §
553, which require public participation before agency action.
[D.E. 24 at 29]. In Count IX, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory
judgment that the promulgation of the online reservation system
and backpacker tax was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, and in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). [D.E. 24
at 30].
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that
Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the imposition of the
online reservation system and backpacker tax, that Plaintiffs’
claims are barred by sovereign immunity, and that the Plaintiffs
have not asserted an independent cause of action that would
allow the Court to issue a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs
respond by asserting that they have concrete injuries, as they
have used the online reservation system and paid the backpacker
fee, and that sovereign immunity does not apply.
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Discovery requesting
that this Court allow discovery to go outside the administrative
record. [D.E. 25]. Plaintiffs believe discovery on this matter
should go forth based on the possibility that portions of the
administrative record have been deleted and that some of the
causes of action do not focus on the online reservation system
and backpacker registration fee. [D.E. 25] In response,
Defendants make many of the same arguments found within their
Motion to Dismiss and also argue that review of agency
decisions, instituted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act, is limited to review of the administrative record. [D.E.
30].
II. Standard of Review
A party may assert a claim of lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “The plaintiff
has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the
motion.” Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Cntys. Rail
Users Ass’n, Inc., 287 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing
Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269
(6th Cir. 1990)). “The plaintiff must show only that the
complaint alleges a claim under federal law, and that the claim
is ‘substantial.’ A federal claim is substantial unless ‘prior
decisions inescapably render it frivolous.’” Musson Theatrical,
Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Transcon. Leasing, Inc. v. Mich. Nat’l Bank of Detroit,
738 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir. 1984)). “The plaintiff will survive
the motion to dismiss by showing ‘any arguable basis in law’ for
the claims set forth in the complaint.” Mich. S. R.R. Co., 287
F.3d at 573 (citations omitted).
A party may present the defense of failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted through motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
complaint. The Court views the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true “well-pleaded
facts” set forth in the complaint. Morgan v. Church’s Fried
Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). “A
complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations
with respect to all material elements necessary to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory.” Weiner v. Klais & Co.,
108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). If it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff’s complaint does not
state facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” then the claims must be dismissed. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also
Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir.
2007). Further, the complaint must establish “enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence” to show the averments are factually plausible.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. While the Court presumes all factual
allegations to be true and makes all reasonable inferences in
favor of Plaintiffs, the Court does not have to “accept
unwarranted factual inferences.” Total Benefits Planning Agency,
Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th
Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). If the “complaint does not
contain any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest”
each essential element of the averred violation, it does not
contain enough factual content to nudge the claim across the
line from conceivable to plausible, and must be dismissed.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680-83 (2009).
III. Analysis
A. Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs have not alleged a factual basis to create an
injury in fact due to the NPS’ decision to create an online
reservation fee, but have alleged an injury in fact to create
standing to challenge the imposition of a backcountry permit
fee. Plaintiffs have asserted claims under the Administrative
Procedure Act, creating subject-matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331, and the NPS has not made discretionary decisions
falling under the narrow exception to the grant of jurisdiction
found in 5 U.S.C. § 702(a)(2). Therefore, Plaintiffs claims
seeking declaratory relief on the subject of the backcountry
camping fee may go forth.
1. Standing
Defendants allege that Plaintiffs do not have standing to
challenge the online reservation system implemented at the Great
Smoky Mountains National Park. To meet the constitutional
requirements of standing, Plaintiffs must show that they
have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical’[;] . . . there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of – the injury has to be ‘fairly traceable
to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the
result of the independent act of some third party not
before the court[;] . . . [and] it must be ‘likely,’
as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury
will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(citations omitted). “An association,” such as Southern Forest
Watch, Inc.,
has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to
sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977). Defendants do not claim that Plaintiffs have not met the
“prudential requirements for standing developed by the Supreme
Court,” and the Court finds that they are not at issue in this
case. See Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d
197, 206 (6th Cir. 2011).
Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have not shown an
injury in fact, and, thus, have no standing to challenge the
online reservation system. Plaintiffs do not explicitly set
forth the concrete injury they have suffered, but state that the
“new registration system, in and of itself, is an impairment or
a burden, especially when compared with the registration system
that has been employed for decades.” [D.E. 19 at 4]. Plaintiffs
go on to claim that “[t]he new backpacker registration system is
more onerous, difficult, an impairment, etc.” [D.E. 19 at 5].
However, Plaintiffs also note, in their Amended Complaint, that
if one does not have email or internet access,
reservations can be made by telephone or by personally
appearing at Sugarland Visitor Center in the Smoky
Mountains to pay cash and manually pick up a camping
permit. Defendants are advising callers they can also
fax a copy of the camping permit to a backpacker.
[D.E. 24 at 20].
These particular Plaintiffs have not alleged an injury such
that they have standing to challenge the online reservation
system. Plaintiffs assert that they have been injured because
the online reservation system is “burdensome,” especially when
compared to the old system. However, a review of receipts
provided by Plaintiffs shows that all individual Plaintiffs were
able to access the online reservation system and obtain a permit
through the use of the online reservation system. Thus,
Plaintiffs have not stated an injury in fact for purposes of
standing because they have not shown that the online reservation
system is so burdensome that they cannot use the system to
obtain a permit.
The facts of this case can be analogized to those in a case
brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In Sharp v.
Capitol City Brewing Co., a quadriplegic brought suit because a
portable trash can in a water closet did not leave enough room
for a person in a wheelchair to transfer herself to the water
closet. 680 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 2010). However, the
district court found that there was no injury in fact because
the “plaintiff’s disability [was] such that he [could not]
transfer himself to a water closet whether a trash can was in
his way or not.” Id. Thus, “the trash can [did] not prevent
plaintiff from engaging in any activity he could otherwise
perform.” Id. Similarly, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the
online reservation system burdens them to such a degree that
they cannot obtain a permit to camp in the backcountry of the
Great Smoky Mountains. In fact, Plaintiffs have provided
receipts showing they were able to utilize the online
reservation system to obtain permits. [D.E. 24-11 at 1-3]. Thus,
the online reservation system has not prevented Plaintiffs from
engaging in an activity in which they could otherwise engage.
Plaintiffs may prefer the old reservation system to the
online reservation system, but Plaintiffs desire for the old
voluntary reservation system does not allege an injury in fact
that creates a case or controversy, thereby giving this Court
jurisdiction. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977)
(“There is, of course a de minimis level of imposition with
which the Constitution is not concerned.”); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972) (“[The goal of putting review]
in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome . .
. would be undermined were we to construe the APA to authorize
judicial review at the behest of organizations or individuals
who seek to do no more than vindicate their own value
preferences through the judicial process.”).
The Court stresses that it is not holding that no person
has standing to challenge the online reservation system. See
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973) (“To deny standing to
persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are
also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread
Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot
accept that conclusion.”). Rather, the Court is holding that
these particular Plaintiffs have not set forth an injury in
fact. For example, a party who could show that they could not
operate the online reservation system to obtain a permit may be
able to show an injury in fact, but these particular Plaintiffs
have provided evidence that they could competently use the
online reservation system in such a way to obtain a permit.
As the individual Plaintiffs do not have standing to
challenge the online reservation system, the Court will not
grant a declaratory judgment pertaining to the implementation of
the online reservation system under any of the claims for
declaratory relief. Furthermore, Plaintiff Southern Forest
Watch, Inc. has not shown that “its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right,” so it also does not have
standing to challenge the implementation of the online
reservation system. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
In their Reply, Defendants assert that they no longer
contest Plaintiffs standing to challenge the imposition of the
backcountry camping fee established under the FLREA. As
Plaintiffs have actually incurred the cost of the new camping
fee, the Court agrees with Defendants assessment, and finds that
the individual Plaintiffs have suffered an injury in fact
through the payment of the fee. See Williams v. Redflex Traffic
Sys., Inc., 582 F.3d 617, 620 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[W]ithout having
been injured by these procedures, she resembles a mere outsider
with a non-justiciable ‘general grievance.’” (citing United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995))).
Plaintiff Southern Forest Watch, Inc., as an association,
also meets the requirements to have standing to challenge the
imposition of the backcountry tax. First, as has been
established, individual members have standing to sue in their
own right. While not found in the pleadings, the “primary
purpose” of the organization appears to be “to stop the illegal
backcountry tax in its tracks.” Southern Forest Watch,
http://www.southernhighlanders.com/Backcountrytax.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2014). Finally, while individual members are
involved in the suit, there is no reason their participation
should be required.
Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment based on, what
they describe as, Defendants’ decision to grant licenses and
rights “to private entities and political elites on such terms
to interfere with the free access” to the Great Smoky Mountains
National Park. [D.E. 24 at 23]. Plaintiffs have met the standing
requirements to challenge this decision. Plaintiffs, by alleging
that they wish to use this portion of the park for hiking, have
alleged a concrete injury. See Jackson Hole Conservation
Alliance v. Babbitt, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1293 (D. Wyo. 2000)
(“[T]he proximity of Mr. Sheahan's residence to the site of the
Proposed Action, and his frequent use of the area, demonstrate
his concrete interest in the dispute by virtue of his
‘geographical nexus to’ and ‘actual use of’ the area affected by
the Proposed Action.” (quoting Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v.
Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1996))); [D.E. 24 at 5]
(“Plaintiffs have offered many solutions and tried repeatedly by
any number of efforts to resolve this issue with the defendants
in order to continue backpacking unimpaired in the Smoky
Mountains.”). Further, the injury can be traced to the
Defendants’ decision to grant a license to the private entities,
and a declaratory judgment that the decision did not comply with
relevant law will redress the injury. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560-61.
2. Sovereign Immunity
Defendants next assert that Plaintiffs cannot challenge the
discretionary decision of the NPS to implement an online
reservation system and to charge a backcountry camping fee due
to the operation of sovereign immunity. Defendants claim that
these were decisions committed to agency discretion by law, and,
therefore, sovereign immunity has not been waived under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). As the Court has found
Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the creation of an
online reservation system, the Court’s analysis of sovereign
immunity will focus on the backpacker permit fee and decision of
the NPS to lease or license portions of the park.
Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that the decision of the
NPS to implement a fee and online reservation system is governed
by the APA. The APA provides judicial review of agency
decisions, 5 U.S.C. § 702, but makes an exception for “agency
action . . . committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. §
701(a)(2); see Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2))
(“[I]t is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that codifies
the nature and attributes of judicial review, including the
traditional principle of its unavailability ‘to the extent that
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.’”).
Subsection (a)(2) applies “in those rare instances where
‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply.’” Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. Rep. No. 752,
79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)); see also Diebold v. United
States, 947 F.2d 787, 789 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Agency action
generally is considered committed to agency discretion where
there is ‘no law to apply.’” (citations omitted)). Thus,
sovereign immunity applies only if there is no law to apply.
To determine if there is law to apply the Court must look
to the statutory authority and regulations issued pursuant to
the relevant statutes. See Diebold, 947 F.2d at 796 (finding
that, to determine if the 5 U.S.C § 701(a)(2) exception applies,
a court must first look to general statutes, then specific
statutes, and, finally, regulations issued pursuant to those
statutes).
First, the Court must look to the general statute, 16
U.S.C. § 1. This statute creates the NPS, the position of
Director, Deputy Director, and allows for “subordinate officers,
clerks, and employees as may be appropriated for by Congress.”
16 U.S.C. § 1. The purpose of the creation of national parks “is
to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and
the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the
same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” Id.
Additionally, Congress has passed a specific statute allowing
for the imposition of recreation fees, based on specific
criteria, and imposing limitations on the ability to charge fees
for camping at undeveloped sites. 16 U.S.C. § 6802.
The regulations governing the NPS provide that “the
superintendent may . . . [d]esignate areas for a specific use or
activity, or impose conditions or restrictions on a use or
activity.” 36 CFR § 1.5(a)(2). That section also provides that:
Except in emergency situations, a closure,
designation, use or activity restriction or condition,
or the termination or relaxation of such, which is of
a nature, magnitude and duration that will result in a
significant alteration in the public use pattern of
the park area, adversely affect the park’s natural,
aesthetic, scenic or cultural values, require a longterm
or significant modification in the resource
management objectives of the unit, or is of a highly
controversial nature, shall be published as rulemaking
in the Federal Register.
Id. § 1.5(b). “To implement a public use limit, the
superintendent may establish a permit, registration, or
reservation system.” Id. § 1.5(d). The next section, 36 CFR §
1.6 provides requirements for a permit system. Further, “[t]he
superintendent may require permits, designate sites or areas,
and establish conditions for camping.” 36 CFR § 2.10. One type
of fee allowed to be charged is a “[d]aily recreation use fee[]
for the use of specialized sites, facilities, equipment or
services furnished at Federal expense.” 36 CFR § 71.2.
There are also statutes and regulations governing the NPS’
decision to grant a license to a private party. “No natural,
curiosities, wonders, or objects of interest shall be leased,
rented, or granted to anyone on such terms as to interfere with
free access to them by the public.” 16 U.S.C. § 3. Further, the
Code of Federal Regulations provides multiple requirements the
NPS must comply with when deciding whether to lease park areas.
36 C.F.R. §§ 18.1 – .12.
Therefore, as the statutes and C.F.R. clearly lay out
standards by which to judge the superintendent’s conduct, the
superintendent’s decision to implement a backpacker registration
fee and decision to lease part of the park does not fall within
the limited exception for sovereign immunity granted by 5 U.S.C.
§ 701.
3. Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ claims should be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the
Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide an independent basis
of subject-matter jurisdiction. However, Plaintiffs do not rely
on the Declaratory Judgment Act as a means for subject-matter
jurisdiction. Rather, Plaintiffs, in the first paragraph of
their amended complaint, state that the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, through operation of the APA.
[W]e note that . . . the National Park Service organic
statute, 16 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. [does not] provide[]
directly for judicial review, and [does not] create[]
a private right of action. . . . However, even absent
a statutory cause of action, [plaintiff] may challenge
the agency’s authority under the APA. [Plaintiff] may
therefore challenge the National Park Service’s 9B
regulations under the APA, and this Court will have
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 112
F.3d 1283, 1286 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Thus,
Plaintiffs may challenge the superintendent’s decision to
implement the backpacker registration fee under the APA, and
this Court will have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1
B. Motion for Discovery
Plaintiffs ask this Court to allow discovery outside of the
administrative record. However, as Plaintiffs provide no
evidence, other than bare assertions of possible misconduct,
with which this Court can decide whether supplementation of the
record is necessary, the motion for discovery beyond the
administrative record must be denied.
_____________________
1 Although not raised by either party, the Court notes that
Plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative
remedies because neither the statutes nor regulations require
exhaustion before pursuing judicial review. See Conservation
Force v. Salazar, 919 F. Supp. 2d 85, 89 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Under
the APA, administrative exhaustion is required when it is
mandated by statute or agency rule.” (citing Darby v. Cisneros,
509 U.S. 137, 146 (1993))).
As a general matter, courts confine their review
to the administrative record, which includes all
materials compiled by the agency that were before the
agency at the time the decision was made. Several
reasons justify supplementation of the administrative
record, such as when an agency deliberately or
negligently excludes certain documents, or when the
court needs certain background information in order to
determine whether the agency considered all of the
relevant factors. Courts have suggested that in order
to justify supplementation, a plaintiff must make a
strong showing of bad faith.
Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 628 (6th Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs simply have not put forth the evidence required
for the Court to allow discovery beyond the administrative
record. Plaintiffs’ bald assertions and questions about the
possibility of bad faith on the part of the NPS is simply not
enough for the Court to allow discovery beyond the
administrative record. See, e.g., [D.E. 26 at 3] (“How does the
Court know what has been deleted from and/or added to the
federal administrative record maintained by the government,
particularly in the time frame the issues arose?”). If, after
review of the administrative record, Plaintiffs have evidence
with which they can put forth a good faith claim to justify
supplementation, Plaintiffs may renew their motion.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED:
1) that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 14] be, and
the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART, in that Plaintiffs do not
have standing to challenge the imposition of an online
reservation system, and DENIED IN PART, in that Plaintiffs may
proceed on their claims challenging the imposition of the
backpacker permit camping fee and decision to grant a license;
(2) that Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery [D.E. 25] be,
and the same hereby is, DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This the 24th day of March, 2014.
Sitting by designation:
Signed By:
Joseph M. Hood JMH
Senior U.S. District Judge
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